Indian Independence with Partition, 1947
The long campaign for Indian independence, which had begun with the Indian Mutiny (1857-59), grew in intensity following the Second World War (1939-45). Indians increasingly expected self-government to be granted in return for their wartime contribution. But with this came serious inter-communal violence between Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims.
The recently elected government in Britain was determined to grant independence and hoped to leave behind some form of united India. But, despite repeated talks, the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League could not agree on the shape of the new state.
Attlee’s Announcement (February 20, 1947)
On February 20, 1947, the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, sensing the trouble all around, made an announcement. The British House of Commons declared the British intention of leaving the Indian subcontinent.
- A deadline of June 30, 1948 was fixed for transfer of power even if the Indian politicians had not agreed by that time on the constitution.
- The British would relinquish power either to some form of central government or in some areas to the existing provincial governments if the constituent assembly was not fully representative, i.e., if the Muslim majority provinces did not join.
- British powers and obligations vis-a-vis the princely states would lapse with transfer of power, but these would not be transferred to any successor government in British India.
- Mountbatten would replace Wavell as the viceroy. Lord Mounbatten, the last British GovernorGeneral and Viceroy arrived in India on March 22, 1947 and immediately began to take measures for the transfer of power.
- The statement contained clear hints of partition and even Balkanisation of the country into numerous states and was, in essence, a reversion of the Cripps Offer.
This was followed by a near chaotic condition in the country as the League resorted to unabashed violence in Calcutta, Assam the Punjab and the North-West Fronter Province.
Why a Date Fixed by Government for Withdrawal?
The government hoped that a fixed date would shock the parties into an agreement on the main question.
The government was keen to avert the developing constitutional crisis.
The government hoped to convince the Indians of British sincerity.
The truth in Wavell’s assessment could no longer be denied—that an irreversible decline of the government’s authority had taken place.
Congress Stand
The provision of transfer of power to more than one centre was acceptable to Congress because it meant that the existing assembly could go ahead and frame a constitution for the areas represented by it, and it offered a way out of the existing deadlock.
But the illusory hopes of a settlement were soon shattered as the statement proved to be a prelude to the final showdown. The League launched a civil disobedience movement to overthrow the coalition government in Punjab, as it felt emboldened by the statement.
Evolution of the Two-Nation Theory
The development of the two-nation theory over the years is as follows:
1887: There was a frontal attack on the Congress by Dufferin, the viceroy, and Colvin, the Lt. Governor of the United Provinces. Syed Ahmed Khan and Raja Shiv Prasad of Bhinga were propped up as an antiCongress front by the government. Syed Ahmed Khan appealed to the educated Muslims to stay away from the Congress, although some Muslims did join the Congress. These included Badruddin Tyabji, Mir Musharraf Hussain, A. Bhimji and Hamid Ali Khan.
1906: Agha Khan led a Muslim delegation (called the Shimla delegation) to the viceroy, Lord Minto, to demand separate electorates for Muslims at all levels and that the Muslim representation should be commensurate not only with their numerical strength but also with their “political importance and their contribution to the British Empire”. Minto assured them of special communal representation in excess of their population for their “extraordinary service” to the empire.
The All India Muslim League was founded by the Agha Khan, Nawab Salimullah of Dacca, Nawab Mohsinul-Mulk and Nawab Waqar-ul-Mulk to preach loyalty to the British government and to keep the Muslim intelligentsia away from the Congress.
1909: Separate electorates were awarded under Morley-Minto Reforms. Punjab Hindu Sabha was founded by U.N. Mukherji and Lal Chand.
1915: First session of All India Hindu Mahasabha was held under the aegis of the Maharaja of Kasim Bazar. 1912-24: During this period, the Muslim League was dominated by younger Muslim nationalists, but their nationalism was inspired by a communal view of political questions.
1916: The Congress accepted the Muslim League demand of separate electorates and the Congress and the League presented joint demands to the government. But the Congress and the League came together as separate political entities and the Congress gave political legitimacy to the existence of the Muslim League.
1920-22: Muslims participated in the Rowlatt and Khilafat Non-Cooperation agitations but there was a communal element in the political outlook of the Muslims.
1920s: The shadow of communal riots loomed large over the country. The Arya Samajists started Shuddhi (purification) and Sangathan (organisation) movements. The Shuddhi movement was aimed at reconverting to Hinduism those who had converted to Islam. The Muslims started the Tabligh and Tanzeem movements in retaliation.
Some nationalists also turned communal. The Swarajists were divided along communal lines and many of the Responsivists among them joined the Hindu Mahasabha. The Ali brothers, after having put up a spectacular united front with the Congress, accused the Congress of protecting only Hindu interests. The Congress failed to evolve a suitable strategy to counter the rise of communalism.
1928: The Nehru Report on constitutional reforms as suggested by the Congress was opposed by Muslim hardliners and the Sikh League. Jinnah proposed fourteen points demanding separate electorates and reservation for Muslims in government service and self-governing bodies. By negotiating with the Muslim League, the Congress made a number of mistakes:
(i) It gave legitimacy to the politics of the League, thus giving recognition to the division of society into separate communities with separate interests.
(ii) It undermined the role of secular, nationalist Muslims.
(iii) Concessions to one community prompted other communities to demand similar concessions.
(iv) Launching an all-out attack on communalism became difficult.
1930-34: Some Muslim groups, such as the Jamaat i-ulema-i-Hind, State of Kashmir and Khudai Khidmatgars participated in the Civil Disobedience Movement but overall the participation of Muslims was nowhere near the level of the Khilafat agitation. While the Congress stayed away from two of the three round table conferences held in London to discuss further constitutional reforms, the communalists attended all three of them.
1932: The Communal Award accepted all Muslim communal demands contained in the 14 points. After 1937: After the Muslim League performed badly in the 1937 provincial elections, it decided to resort to extreme communalism. There began a tendency to project the Muslims, not as a minority but as a separate nation (in the early 1930s this idea of a separate Muslim nation was proposed by a young Muslim intellectual Rahmat Ali and later developed further by the poet Iqbal). From now onwards, communalism was organised as a mass movement with its base among middle and upper classes. Vicious propaganda was launched against the Congress by Z.A. Suleri, F.M. Durrani, Fazl-ul-Haq, etc. Extreme communalism was based on fear, hatred and violence of word and deed.
Till 1937 there had been liberal communalism, centred around safeguards and reservations. It was communal while upholding certain liberal, democratic, humanistic and nationalistic values and the notion that these diverse communities could be welded together into one nation in one national interest.
The extreme communalism of Muslims found its echo in the militant communal nationalism of Hindus represented by organisations such as the Hindu Mahasabha and RSS and in the thoughts of leaders like Golwalkar. There were several reasons for the advent of extreme communalism:
(i) With increasing radicalisation, the reactionary elements searched for a social base through channels of communalism.
(ii) The colonial administration had exhausted all other means to divide nationalists.
(iii) Earlier failures to challenge communal tendencies had emboldened the communal forces.
1937-39:Jinnah blocked all avenues for conciliation by forwarding the impossible demand that the Congress should declare itself a Hindu organisation and recognise the Muslim League as the sole representative of the Indian Muslims.
March 24, 1940: The ‘Pakistan Resolution’ was passed at the Lahore session of the Muslim League calling for “grouping of all geographically contiguous Muslim majority areas (mainly north-western and eastern India) into independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign, and adequate safeguards to Muslims in other areas where they are in a minority”.
During Second World War: The British India Government gave a virtual veto to the League on political settlement. The League made full use of this privilege and stuck to its demand of a separate Pakistan throughout the negotiations under the August Offer, Cripps’ proposals, Shimla Conference and Cabinet Mission Plan. Finally, it got what it had aspired for—an independent Pakistan comprising Muslim majority areas of Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, North-West Frontier Province and Bengal in 1947.
Independence and Partition
The communal riots and the unworkability of the Congress-League coalition compelled many in early 1947 to think in terms of accepting the so far unthinkable idea of partition.
- The most insistent demand now came from the Hindu and Sikh communal groups in Bengal and Punjab who were alarmed at the prospect of compulsory grouping which might find them in Pakistan.
- The Hindu Mahasabha in Bengal was assessing the feasibility of a separate Hindu province in West Bengal.
- On March 10, 1947, Nehru stated that the Cabinet Mission’s was the best solution if carried out; the only real alternative was the partition of Punjab and Bengal.
In April 1947, the Congress president, Kripalani, communicated to the viceroy— “... rather than have a battle, we shall let them have their Pakistan provided you allow Bengal and Punjab to be partitioned in a fair manner.”
Lord Mountbatten as the Viceroy
Mountbatten proved more firm and quick in taking decisions than his predecessors because he was informally given more powers to decide things on the spot.
- He also had the advantage of the firm decision of the British government to quit at the earliest.
- His task was to explore the options of unity and division till October 1947 and then advise the British government on the form of transfer of power.
- But he soon discovered that the broad contours of the scenario to emerge were discernible even before he came to India.
The Cabinet Mission Plan was a dead horse and Jinnah was obstinate about not settling for anything less than a sovereign state. But a serious attempt at unity would involve supporting those forces which wanted a unified India and countering those who opposed it. Mountbatten preferred to woo both sides.
Mountbatten Plan, or June 3rd Plan (June 3, 1947)
The freedom-with-partition formula was coming to be widely accepted well before Mountbatten arrived in India. One major innovation (actually suggested by V.P. Menon) was the immediate transfer of power on the basis of grant of dominion status (with a right of secession), thus obviating the need to wait for an agreement in the constituent assembly on a new political structure.
Main Points
The important points of the plan were as follows:
- Punjab and Bengal Legislative Assemblies would meet in two groups, Hindus and Muslims, to vote for partition. If a simple majority of either group voted for partition, then these provinces would be partitioned.
- In case of partition, two dominions and two constituent assemblies would be created.
- Sindh would take its own decision.
- Referendums in NWFP and Sylhet district of Bengal would decide the fate of these areas.
- Since the Congress had conceded a unified India, all their other points would be met, namely,
(i) independence for princely states ruled out—they would join either India or Pakistan;
(ii) independence for Bengal ruled out;
(iii) accession of Hyderabad to Pakistan ruled out (Mountbatten supported the Congress on this);
(iv) freedom to come on August 15, 1947; and
(v) a boundary commission to be set up if partition was to be effected.
Thus, the League’s demand was conceded to the extent that Pakistan would be created and the Congress’ position on unity was taken into account to make Pakistan as small as possible. Mountbatten’s formula was to divide India but retain maximum unity.
Why Congress Accepted Dominion Status?
The Congress was willing to accept dominion status despite its being against the Lahore Congress (1929) spirit because:
(i) it would ensure a peaceful and quick transfer of power;
(ii) it was more important for the Congress to assume authority to check the explosive situation; and
(iii) it would allow for some much needed continuity in the bureaucracy and the army.
For Britain, the dominion status offered a chance to keep India in the Commonwealth, even if temporarily, considering the economic strength, defence potential and greater value of trade and investment in India.
Rationale for an Early Date (August 15, 1947)
Britain wanted to secure Congress’ agreement to the dominion status. At the same time, the British could escape the responsibility for the communal situation. The plan was put into effect without the slightest delay.
- The legislative assemblies of Bengal and Punjab decided in favour of partition of these two provinces.
- Thus, East Bengal and West Punjab joined Pakistan; West Bengal and East Punjab remained with the Indian Union.
- The referendum in Sylhet resulted in the incorporation of that district in East Bengal.
- Two boundary commissions, one in respect of each province, were constituted to demarcate the boundaries of the new provinces.
- The referendum in NWFP decided in favour of Pakistan, the Provincial Congress refraining from the referendum. Baluchistan and Sindh threw in their lot with Pakistan.
Indian Independence Act
On July 5, 1947 the British Parliament passed the Indian Independence Act which was based on the Mountbatten Plan, and the Act got royal assent on July 18, 1947. The Act was implemented on August 15, 1947.
- The Act provided for the creation of two independent dominions of India and Pakistan with effect from August 15, 1947.
- Each dominion was to have a governor-general to be responsible for the effective operation of the Act.
- The constituent assembly of each new dominion was to exercise the powers of the legislature of that dominion, and the existing Central Legislative Assembly and the Council of States were to be automatically dissolved.
- For the transitional period, i.e., till a new constitution was adopted by each dominion, the governments of the two dominions were to be carried on in accordance with the Government of India Act, 1935.
As per the provisions of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, Pakistan became independent on August 14 while India got its freedom on August 15, 1947. M.A. Jinnah became the first Governor-General of Pakistan. India, however, decided to request Lord Mountbatten to continue as the Governor-General of India.
Problems of Early Withdrawal
The breakneck speed of events under Mountbatten caused anomalies in arranging the details of partition and totally failed to prevent the Punjab massacre, because:
(i) there were no transitional institutional structures within which partition problems could be tackled;
(ii) Mountbatten had hoped to be the common Governor-General of India and Pakistan, thus providing the necessary link, but Jinnah wanted the position for himself in Pakistan;
(iii) there was a delay in announcing the Boundary Commission Award (under Radcliffe); though the award was ready by August 12, 1947 Mountbatten decided to make it public after August 15 so that the British could escape all responsibility of disturbances.
Integration of States
During 1946-47 there was a new upsurge of the State People’s Movement demanding political rights and elective representation in the Constituent Assembly.
- Nehru presided over the All India State People’s Conference sessions in Udaipur (1945) and Gwalior (April 1947). He declared that the states refusing to join the Constituent Assembly would be treated as hostile.
- In July 1947, Vallabhbhai Patel took charge of the new States Department. Under Patel, the incorporation of Indian states took place in two phases with a skilful combination of baits and threats of mass pressure in both.
Phase I: By August 15, 1947, all states except Kashmir, Hyderabad and Junagarh had signed an instrument of accession with the Indian government, acknowledging central authority over defence, external affairs and communication. The princes agreed to this fairly easily because:
(i) they were ‘surrendering’ only what they never had (these three functions had been a part of the British paramountcy) and
(ii) there was no change in the internal political structure.
Phase II: The second phase involved a much more difficult process of ‘integration’ of states with neighbouring provinces or into new units like the Kathiawar Union, Vindhya and Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan or Himachal Pradesh along with internal constitutional changes in states which for some yearsretained their old boundaries (Hyderabad, Mysore, Travancore-Cochin). This phase was accomplished within a year. The principal bait offered was a generous privy purse while some princes were made governors and Rajpramukhs in free India.
This rapid political unification of the country after independence was Patel’s greatest achievement.
Why Congress Accepted Partition?
The Congress was only accepting the inevitable due to the long-term failure to draw the Muslim masses into the national movement. The partition reflects the success-failure dichotomy of the Congress-led anti-imperialist movement. The Congress had a two-fold task:
(i) structuring diverse classes, communities, groups and regions into a nation, and
(ii) securing independence for this nation.
While the Congress succeeded in building up sufficient national consciousness to exert pressure on the British to quit India, it failed to complete the task of welding the nation, especially in integrating the Muslims into the nation.
Only an immediate transfer of power could forestall the spread of ‘direct action’ and communal violence. The virtual collapse of the Interim Government also made the notion of Pakistan appear unavoidable. The partition plan ruled out independence for the princely states which could have been a greater danger to Indian unity as it would have meant Balkanisation of the country.
Acceptance of partition was only a final act of the process of step-by-step concessions to the League’s championing of a separate Muslim state.
(i) During Cripps Mission (1942), autonomy of Muslim majority provinces was accepted.
(ii) During Gandhi-Jinnah talks (1944), Gandhi accepted the right of self-determination of Muslim-majority provinces.
(iii) After the Cabinet Mission Plan (1946) Congress conceded the possibility of Muslim majority provincessetting up a separate constituent assembly. Later, the Congress accepted, without demur, that grouping was compulsory (December 1946).
(iv) Official reference to Pakistan came in March 1947, when CWC resolution stated that Punjab (and by implication, Bengal) must be partitioned if the country was divided.
(v) With the 3rd June Plan, Congress accepted partition.
While loudly asserting the sovereignty of the Constituent Assembly, the Congress quietly accepted compulsory grouping and accepted the partition most of all because it could not stop the communal riots.
There was nevertheless much wishful thinking and lack of appreciation of the dynamics of communal feeling by the Congress, especially in Nehru who stated at various times—“Once the British left, Hindu Muslim differences would be patched up and a free, united India would be built up.” “Partition is only temporary.”
“Partition would be peaceful—once Pakistan was conceded, what was there to fight for?”
The communalism of the 1920s and the 1930s was different from that of the 1940s. Now it was an all-out effort for an assertive ‘Muslim nation’. Congress leadership underestimated the potential of this type of communalism.
Gandhi’s Bid to Restore Peace
Gandhi felt helpless because there had been a communalisation of the people.
- He had no option but to accept partition because the people wanted it. How could there be a movement to fight communalism involving a communalised people? He asked the Congressmen, however, not to accept it in their hearts.
- He moved to villages of East Bengal (present-day Bangladesh) to the villages of Bihar and then to the riot-torn slums of Calcutta and Delhi, in a heroic effort to stop Hindus and Muslims kill each other, careful everywhere to reassure the minority community
- In October 1946, Muslims in East Bengal targeted Hindus.
- Gandhiji visited the area, toured the villages on foot, and persuaded the local Muslims to guarantee the safety of Hindus.
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