Second World War and Nationalistic Response

There was some apparent disarray within the Congress in the aftermath of the civil disobedience movement. In Gandhi’s perception there was rising corruption and indiscipline in the organisation. He was also unhappy with the rivalries and petty squabbles among the Congress leaders. There were issues of bogus membership and unethical means employed in trying to getting into the Congress committees and controlling them.

Gandhi firmly believed that the Congress should first put its house in order before the movement could again be launched; besides, he also felt the masses were not in the mood for a struggle. There were others who felt that the struggle should continue.

Subhash Chandra Bose and Congress Sessions of Haripura and Tripuri

Subhash Chandra Bose was president of the Bengal Provincial Congress Committee. His main area of work lay in the organisation of the youth and promoting the trade union movement.

• Subhash Bose did not agree with Gandhi and other leaders of the Congress on many aspects of the struggle for freedom.
• He along with Jawaharlal Nehru opposed the Motilal Nehru Report which spoke for dominion status for India. 
• Bose was all for full independence; he also announced the formation of the Independence League.
• When the Lahore Congress session under Jawaharlal Nehru’s presidency adopted a resolution that the Congress goal would be ‘Poorna Swaraj’, Bose fully endorsed the decision.
• He was again fully active in the Salt Satyagraha Movement in 1930, forcing the government to arrest him.
• He was vehemently against the suspension of the Civil Disobedience Movement and the signing of the Gandhi-Irwin Pact in 1931, especially as the government refused to negotiate on the death sentence for Bhagat Singh and his associates.

From all this we get a clear idea that Bose was a man of action and radical ideas.

Haripura Session

At the Congress meeting in Haripura, Gujarat, in February 1938, Bose was unanimously elected president of the session.

• He was firm in his belief that the Congress ministries in the provinces had immense revolutionary potential, as he said in his presidential address.
• Bose also talked of economic development of the country through planning and was instrumental in setting up a National Planning Committee later.
• The session adopted a resolution that the Congress would give moral support to those who were agitating against the governance in the princely states.

In the following months, the international situation was highly disturbed; there were clear signs that Europe was going to be embroiled in war. 

Congress Faces Internal Strife 

In January 1939, Subhash Bose decided to stand again for the president’s post in the Congress. Gandhi was not happy with Bose’s candidature.

• Bose said he represented the “new ideas, ideologies, problems and programmes” that had come out of the “the progressive sharpening of the anti-imperialist struggle in India”.
• However, Sardar Patel, Rajendra Prasad, J.B. Kripalani and some other members of the Congress Working Committee pointed out that it was in the various Congress bodies, such as the working committee, that ideologies and programmes were developed; moreover, the position of the Congress president was more of a constitutional one, representative and symbolic of the unity of the nation.
• They favoured the candidate supported by Gandhi, namely, Pattabhi Sitaramayya.
• Subhash Bose won the election by 1580 votes against 1377; he got the full support of the Congress Socialist Party and the communists.

Gandhi congratulated Bose on his victory but also declared that “Pattabhi’s defeat is my defeat.” Now it became a Gandhi versus Bose issue.

Tripuri Session

In March 1939 the Congress session took place at Tripuri, in the Central Provinces (near Jabalpur in present Madhya Pradesh). It was obvious that all was not well within the Congress. The working committee, the ruling body of the Congress, is not elected, but nominated by the president; the election of the president is thus a constitutional opportunity through which the membership expressed the nature of the leadership of the Congress.

With Bose’s victory the polarisation in terms of ideology and method of future struggle was clear. Thus the election of Bose, in the face of the opposition of the official machine, led to a sharp inner crisis. Subhash Bose had accused the working committee leaders of being ready to reach a compromise with the government on the matter of federation. Now, those leaders felt they could not work with a president who had publicly cast doubts on their nationalistic principles and resigned from the working committee.

• Bose was ill when the Tripuri session took place, but he attended it and in his presidential speech he prophesised that an imperialist war was about to take place in Europe.
• He was in favour of giving a six-month ultimatum to Britain to grant the national demand of independence; if the ultimatum was rejected, he said, a mass civil disobedience movement should be launched.
• In his opinion, as Bose was to write later, the Congress was strong enough just as the masses were ready for such a struggle. He felt that advantage should be taken of the international crisis to strive for independence.
• Gandhi, on the other hand, was firm in the belief that it was not the time for such ultimatums as neither the Congress nor the masses were yet ready for struggle. He was also aware that there were communal discord and class strife and a lack of unified vision and that this would undermine any movement.

A resolution was moved by Govind Ballabh Pant, reaffirming faith in Gandhian policies and asking Bose to nominate the working committee “in accordance with the wishes of Gandhiji”, and it was passed without opposition from the socialists or the communist

Apparently, the Left was not keen on discarding Gandhi’s leadership. However, Gandhi said that he would not like to impose a working committee on the president and that, since Bose was the president, he should choose the members of the working committee and lead the Congress.

Bose continued his effort to win Gandhi’s confidence but did not succeed. Bose refused to nominate a new working committee. Bose wanted an immediate struggle led by Gandhi, whereas Gandhi was firm in his belief that the time was not ripe for struggle. The problem was that ideologically Gandhi and Bose were on different platforms.

Gandhi was not willing to lead a Congress struggle based on the radical lines preferred by Bose, even as Bose was not willing to compromise on his ideas. Gandhi was of the view that he would either lead the Congress on the basis of his own strategy and style of politics or surrender the position of the leader. In his reply to a letter from Bose, Gandhi wrote: “The views you express seem to be so diametrically opposed to those of the others and my own that I do not see any possibility of bridging them.”

Bose had misjudged the support he had got in his election. Even the socialists and the communists for the most part were not keen on a split in the Congress. They realised that a split would reduce the Left (which was not very consolidated at the time) to a splinter group. They preferred a united Congress led by Gandhi, as the national struggle was of utmost importance and the Congress was at the time the main organ of this struggle.

In the circumstances, Bose saw no option but to resign. He resigned from the president’s post in April 1939. This led to the election of Rajendra Prasad as president of the Congress. The crisis in the Congress had been overcome for the present.

Forward Bloc

In May, Bose and his followers formed the Forward Bloc (at Makur, Unnao) as a new party within the Congress. But when he gave a call for an all-India protest on July 9 against an AICC resolution, the Congress Working Committee took disciplinary action against Bose.

In August 1939, he was removed from the post of president of the Bengal Provincial Congress Committee besides being debarred from holding any elective office in the Congress for a period of three years.

Second World War and Nationalistic Response

On September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland – the action that led to the Second World War. On September 3, 1939, Britain declared war against Germany and the British Government of India declared India’s support for the war without consulting Indian opinion.

Congress Offer to Viceroy

Though the Congress did not like the unilateral action of the British of drawing India into the war without consulting the Indians, it decided to support the war effort conditionally. The hostility of the Congress to Fascism, Nazism, militarism and imperialism had been much more consistent than the British record. The Indian offer to cooperate in the war effort had two basic conditions:

(i) After the war, a constituent assembly should be convened to determine political structure of a free India.

(ii) Immediately, some form of a genuinely responsible government should be established at the Centre.

The offer was rejected by Linlithgow, the viceroy. The Congress argued that these conditions were necessary to win public opinion for war. 

Wardha CWC Meeting

The official Congress position was adopted at the Wardha session of the Congress Working Committee, but before that different opinions were voiced on the question of Indian support to British war efforts.

Gandhi, who had all sympathy for Britain in this war because of his total dislike of the fascist ideology, advocated an unconditional support to the Allied powers. He made a clear distinction between the democratic nations of western Europe and the totalitarian Nazis and fascists. He said that he was not willing to embarrass the British government during the war.

Subhas Bose and other socialists, such as Acharya Narendra Dev and Jayaprakash Narayan, who had been invited by the Congress to attend the Wardha meeting so that different opinions could be discussed, had no sympathy for either side in the war. In their opinion, the war was being fought by imperialists on both sides; each side wanted to protect its colonial possessions and gain more territories to colonise, so neither side should be supported by the nationalists. In fact, they thought it was the ideal time to launch a civil disobedience movement, to thus take advantage of the situation and snatch freedom from Britain.

Jawaharlal Nehru was not ready to accept the opinion of either Gandhi or of the socialists. He was clear in his mind about the difference between democratic values and fascism. He believed that justice was on the side of Britain, France and Poland, but he also believed that Britain and France were imperialist powers, and that “the war was the result of the inner contradictions of capitalism maturing since the end of World War I”. He, therefore, advocated no Indian participation till India itself was free. However, at the same time, no advantage was to be taken of Britain’s difficulty by starting an immediate civil disobedience movement.

Gandhi was more or less isolated in his stand. In the end he decided to go with Nehru’s position, which was adopted by the Congress Working Committee. The CWC resolution condemned Fascist aggression. It said that:

(i) India could not be party to a war being fought, on the face of it, for democratic freedom, while that freedom was being denied to India;

(ii) if Britain was fighting for democracy and freedom, it should be proved by ending imperialism in its colonies and establishing full democracy in India;

(iii) the government should declare its war aims soon and, also, as to how the principles of democracy were to be applied to India after the war.

The Congress leadership wanted “to give every chance to the viceroy and the British Government”.

Government Response and Congress Ministries’ Resignation

The government’s response was entirely negative. Viceroy Linlithgow, in his statement, made on October 17, 1939, tried to use the Muslim League and the princes against the Congress. The government:

• refused to define British war aims beyond stating that Britain was resisting aggression;
• said it would, as part of future arrangement, consult “representatives of several communities, parties and interests in India, and the Indian princes” as to how the Act of 1935 might be modified;
• said it would immediately set up a “consultative committee” whose advice could be sought whenever required.

Linlithgow’s statement was not an aberration, but a part of general British policy — “to take advantage of the war to regain the lost ground from the Congress” by provoking the Congress into a confrontation with the government and then using the extraordinary situation to acquire draconian powers. 

Even before the declaration of the War, emergency powers had been acquired for the Centre in respect of provincial subjects by amending the 1935 Act. Defence of India ordinance had been enforced the day the War was declared, thus restricting civil liberties. In May 1940, a top secret Draft Revolutionary Movement Ordinance had been prepared, aimed at launching crippling pre-emptive strikes on the Congress.

The government could then call upon the Allied troopsstationed in India. It could also win an unusual amount of liberal and leftist sympathy all over the world by painting an aggressive Congress as being pro-Japan and pro-Germany.

British Indian reactionary policies received full support from the Prime Minister of Britain, Winston Churchill, and the Secretary of State, Zetland, who branded the Congress as a purely Hindu organisation. It became clear that the British government had no intention of loosening its hold, during or after the war, and was willing to treat the Congress as an enemy.

Gandhi reacted sharply to the government’s insensitivity to Indian public opinion — “... there is to be no democracy for India if Britain can prevent it.” Referring to the minorities and other special interests, Gandhi said, “Congress will safeguard minority rights provided they do not advance claims inconsistent with India’s independence.”

Congress Ministries Decide to Resign

On October 23, 1939, the CWC meeting:

• rejected the Viceroy’s statement as a reiteration of the old imperialist policy;
• decided not to support the war; and
• called upon the Congress ministries to resign in the provinces.

Question of Immediate Mass Satyagraha

After Linlithgow’s statement of October 1939, the debate on the question of immediate mass struggle began once again. Gandhi and his supporters were not in favour of an immediate struggle because they felt that the:

• allied cause was just;
• communal sensitiveness and lack of Hindu-Muslim unity could result in communal riots;
• Congress organisation was in shambles and the atmosphere was not conducive for a mass struggle;  and
• masses were not ready for a struggle.

They instead advocated toning up the Congress organisation, carrying on political work among the masses, and negotiating till all possibilities of a negotiated settlement were exhausted. Only then would the struggle be begun.

In January 1940, Linlithgow stated, “Dominion status of Westminster variety, after the war, is the goal of British policy in India.”

In its meeting in Allahabad in November 1939, the Congress Working Committee passed a resolution observing that “the course of the war and the policy pursued by the British and the French governments and in particular the declarations made on behalf of the British government in regard to India, seem to demonstrate that the present war, like the World War of 1914-18, is being carried on for imperialist ends, and the British imperialism is to remain entrenched in India. With such a war and with this policy the Congress cannot associate itself, and it cannot countenance the exploitation of India’s resources to this end.”

It was reiterated that India’s independence and of the right of Indians to frame their constitution through a constituent assembly should be recognised and that it was only through such a constituent assembly that communal and other problems could be tackled.

Ramgarh Session of the Congress

The Ramgarh session of the Congress was held in March 1940 with Maulana Abul Kalam Azad in the president’s chair. All agreed that a battle must be waged but there was disagreement over the form.

• It was decided to leave the form and timing to Gandhi. But even now, Gandhi was in favour of continued cooperation at the provincial level. He said that he would offer the British moral support during the war but on a non-violent basis.
• However, Jawaharlal Nehru reiterated that complete independence for India must be a precondition for Congress support to the British war effort.
• Subhash Bose continued with his strong militant stand of direct action against the colonial government forcing it to agree to the grant of freedom. Once again he pointed out that Britain’s difficulty was to be seized as India’s opportunity.

The Congress finally declared at the session that the people of India would accept nothing short of complete independence. Indian freedom could not be in the form of dominion or any other status within the imperial structure.

Sovereignty, said the Congress resolution, must rest with the people, whether in the States (the princely states) or the provinces. It was also decided that “Congress would resort to civil disobedience as soon as the Congress organisation is considered fit enough or if circumstances precipitate a crisis.”

Two Nations Theory and Lahore Resolution (1940)

Amidst all the confusion over war and Congress’ dilemma of joining the war, Muslim League passed a resolution in its 1940 session declaring that ‘Muslims are not a minority, but a separate nation’. This gave rise to ‘Two nation Theory’.

• It called for the creation of 'independent states' for Muslims in British India.
• The constituent units of these states were to be autonomous and sovereign.
• The name ‘Pakistan’ had been suggested in 1933 by a Cambridge scholar Rehmat Ali, but was not formally announced in this resolution.

The Muslim League passed a resolution calling for “grouping of geographically contiguous areas where Muslims are in majority (North-West, East) into independent states in which constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign and adequate safeguards to Muslims where they are in minority”.

August Offer

Hitler’s astounding success and the fall of Belgium, Holland and France put England in a conciliatory mood. As the war in Europe had undertaken a new turn, the dominant Congress leadership was again in a dilemma. Both Gandhi and Nehru strongly opposed the idea of taking advantage of Britain’s position.

The Congress was ready to compromise, asking the British government to let it form an interim government during the war period but the government was not interested. The government came up with its own offer to get the cooperation of India in the war effort. Linlithgow announced the August Offer (August 1940) which proposed:

• dominion status as the objective for India;
• expansion of viceroy’s executive council which would have a majority of Indians (who would be drawn from major political parties);
• setting up of a constituent assembly after the war where mainly Indians would decide the constitution according to their social, economic and political conceptions, subject to fulfilment of the obligation of the government regarding defence, minority rights, treaties with States, all India services; and
• no future constitution to be adopted without the consent of minorities.

Nationalists Responses

The Congress rejected the August Offer.

• Nehru said, “Dominion status concept is dead as a doornail.”
• Gandhi said that the declaration had widened the gulf between the nationalists and the British rulers.
• The Muslim League welcomed the veto assurance given to the League, and reiterated its position that partition was the only solution to the deadlock.

However, this was for the first time, the inherent right of Indians to frame their constitution was recognised and the Congress demand for a constituent assembly was conceded. Dominion status was explicitly offered.

In July 1941, the viceroy’s executive council was enlarged to give the Indians a majority of 8 out of 12 for the first time, but the British remained in charge of defence, finance and home. Also, a National Defence Council was set up with purely advisory functions.

Individual Satyagraha

The government had taken the adamant position that no constitutional advance could be made till the Congress came to an agreement with the Muslim leaders. It issued ordinance after ordinance taking away the freedom of speech and that of the press and the right to organise associations.

Towards the end of 1940, the Congress once again asked Gandhi to take command. Gandhi now began taking steps which would lead to a mass struggle within his broad strategic perspective. He decided to initiate a limited satyagraha on an individual basis by a few selected individuals in every locality.

The aims of launching individual satyagraha were:

(i) to show that nationalist patience was not due to weakness;

(ii) to express people’s feeling that they were not interested in the war and that they made no distinction between Nazism and the double autocracy that ruled India; and

(iii) to give another opportunity to the government to accept Congress’ demands peacefully.

The demand of the satyagrahi would be the freedom of speech against the war through an anti-war declaration. If the government did not arrest the satyagrahi, he or she would not only repeat it but move into villages and start a march towards Delhi, thus precipitating a movement which came to be known as the ‘Delhi Chalo Movement’.

Vinoba Bhave was the first to offer the satyagraha and Nehru, the second. By May 1941, 25,000 people had been convicted for individual civil disobedience.

Gandhi Designates Nehru as his Successor

The Congress leaders, released in December 1941, in the midst of Japan’s aggressive actions, were anxious to defend Indian territory and go to the aid of the Allies. The CWC overrode Gandhi’s and Nehru’s objections and passed a resolution offering to cooperate with the government in the defence of India, if:

(i) full independence was given after the war, and

(ii) substance of power was transferred immediately.

It was at this time that Gandhi designated Nehru as his chosen successor.

Debate: Nehru vs Gandhi

Nehru and Gandhi differed in temperament and attitudes towards modernity, religion, God, State and industrialisation.

• Nehru was indifferent to religion, Gandhi believed deeply in his own version of God; Nehru believed that industrialisation was the only solution to the acute and widespread poverty of India, while Gandhi called for the reviving of the rural economy.
• Nehru believed in the powers of the modern State to elevate and reform society, while Gandhi was sceptical of State power, trusting instead to the conscience and willingness of individuals and communities.

Despite having so many differences, Nehru revered Gandhi, and Gandhi, in turn, believed in Nehru more than his own sons. 

Similarities:

• Both teacher and disciple had fundamental similarities—patriotism in an inclusive sense, i.e., they identified with India as a whole rather than with a particular caste, language, region or religion.
• Both believed in non-violence and democratic form of government.

In his book, The Good Boatman, Rajmohan Gandhi writes that Gandhi preferred Nehru to the alternatives because he most reliably reflected the pluralist, inclusive idea of India that the Mahatma himself stood for.

The alternatives—Patel, Rajaji, Azad, Kripalani, Rajendra Prasad—had somewhat sectional interests and affiliations. But Nehru was a Hindu who could be trusted by Muslims, a north-Indian who was respected in south India, and a man who was admired by women. Like Gandhi, Nehru was genuinely an all-India leader, who gave Indians hope—that they could build a more prosperous and peaceful society.

Cripps Mission

In March 1942, a mission headed by Stafford Cripps was sent to India with constitutional proposals to seek Indian support for the war. Stafford Cripps was a left-wing Labourite, the leader of the House of Commons and a member of the British War Cabinet who had actively supported the Indian national movement.

Why Cripps Mission was Sent?

• Because of the reverses suffered by Britain in South-East Asia, the Japanese threat to invade India seemed real now and Indian support became crucial.
• There was pressure on Britain from the Allies (USA, USSR, China) to seek Indian cooperation.
• Indian nationalists had agreed to support the Allied cause if substantial power was transferred immediately and complete independence given after the war.

Main Proposals

The main proposals of the mission were as follows:

(i) An Indian Union with a dominion status would be set up; it would be free to decide its relations with the Commonwealth and free to participate in the United Nations and other international bodies.

(ii) After the end of the war, a constituent assembly would be convened to frame a new constitution. Members of this assembly would be partly elected by the provincial assemblies through proportional representation and partly nominated by the princes.

(iii) The British government would accept the new constitution subject to two conditions:

• any province not willing to join the Union could have a separate constitution and form a separate Union, and
• the new constitution making body and the British government would negotiate a treaty to effect the transfer of power and to safeguard racial and religious minorities.

(iv) In the meantime, defence of India would remain in British hands and the governor-general’s powers would remain intact.

Departures from the Past and Implications

The proposals differed from those offered in the past in many respects:

• The making of the constitution was to be solely in Indian hands now (and not ‘mainly’ in Indian hands—as contained in the August Offer).
• A concrete plan was provided for the constituent assembly.
• Option was available to any province to have a separate constitution—a blueprint for India’s partition.
• Free India could withdraw from the Commonwealth.
• Indians were allowed a large share in the administration in the interim period.

Failure of Cripps Mission

The Cripps Mission proposals failed to satisfy Indian nationalists and turned out to be merely a propaganda device for the consumption of the US and the Chinese. Various parties and groups had objections to the proposals on different points.

The Congress objected to:

(i) the offer of dominion status instead of a provision for complete independence;

(ii) representation of the princely states by nominees and not by elected representatives;

(iii) right to provinces to secede as this went against the principle of national unity; and

(iv) absence of any plan for immediate transfer of power and absence of any real share in defence; the governor-general’s supremacy had been retained, and the demand that the governor-general be only the constitutional head had not been accepted.

Nehru and Maulana Azad were the official negotiators for the Congress.

The Muslim League

(i) criticised the idea of a single Indian Union;

(ii) did not like the machinery for the creation of a constituent assembly and the procedure to decide on the accession of provinces to the Union; and

(iii) thought that the proposals denied the Muslims the right to self-determination and the creation of Pakistan.

Other groups also objected to the provinces’ right to secede.

The Liberals considered the secession proposals to be against the unity and security of India.

The Hindu Mahasabha criticised the basis of the right to secede.

The depressed classes thought that partition would leave them at the mercy of the caste Hindus.

The Sikhs objected that partition would take away Punjab from them.

The explanation that the proposals were meant not to supersede the August Offer but to clothe general provisions with precision cast doubts on the British intentions. The incapacity of Cripps to go beyond the Draft Declaration and the adoption of a rigid “take it or leave it” attitude added to the deadlock. Cripps had earlier talked of “cabinet” and “national government” but later he said that he had only meant an expansion of the executive council.

The procedure of accession was not well-defined. The decision on secession was to be taken by a resolution in the legislature by a 60 per cent majority. If less than 60 per cent of members supported it, the decision was to be taken by a plebiscite of adult males of that province by a simple majority. This scheme weighed against the Hindus in Punjab and Bengal if they wanted accession to the Indian Union. It was not clear as to who would implement and interpret the treaty effecting the transfer of power. Churchill (the British prime minister), Amery (the secretary of state), Linlithgow (the viceroy) and Ward (the commander-in-chief) consistently torpedoed Cripps’ efforts. Talks broke down on the question of the viceroy’s veto.

Gandhi described the scheme as “a post-dated cheque”; Nehru pointed out that the “existing structure and autocratic powers would remain and a few of us will become the viceroy’s liveried camp followers and look after canteens and the like”. Stafford Cripps returned home leaving behind a frustrated and embittered Indian people, who, though still sympathising with the victims of Fascist aggression, felt that the existing situation in the country had become intolerable and that the time had come for a final assault on imperialism.

Share

& Comment

Tweet